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ABSTRACT
Focusing on 8 drug types on the WHO-approved medicine list, we constructed an original dataset of 899
drug samples from 17 low- and median-income countries and tested them for visual appearance,
disintegration, and analyzed their ingredients by chromatography  and spectrometry. Fifteen percent
of the samples fail at least one test and can be considered substandard. After controlling for local
factors, we find that failing drugs are priced 13-18% lower than non-failingdrugs but the signaling
effect of price is far from complete, especially for non-innovator brands. Thelook of the pharmacy, 
as assessed by our covert shoppers, is weakly correlated with the results of qualitytests. These findings 
suggest that consumers are likely to suspect low quality from market price, non-innovator brand and the look






















Poor-quality medicine is a global public health problem. Not only do counterfeit drugs 
prevail, some legitimate manufacturers make substandard drugs due to inappropriate production 
and  some  genuine  drugs  could  degrade  and  become  substandard  through  inappropriate 
distribution.  According  to  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO  2003),  substandard  and 
counterfeit drugs have been found in both developed and developing countries
1, accounting for 
more than 10% of the global medicines market and over US$32 billion in annual earnings. Even 
medicines sold for deadly diseases such as malaria are faked or poorly manufactured (Dondorp et 
al. 2004; WHO 2009). Poor-quality drugs are dangerous: they may be wrongly labeled, contain 
the wrong type of ingredient, formulate the active ingredients incorrectly, or be contaminated 
with pathogens, leading to ineffectiveness, direct harm, or even death (WHO 2003; 2010).  
Surprisingly, there is little economic analysis on this topic although the policy efforts to 
stem  the  flow  of  counterfeit  and  substandard  medicines  have  begun.  One  policy  tool  is  to 
strengthen the enforcement of intellectual property (e.g. the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) 
while others argue that trademark protection does not necessarily lead to better quality control 
and could hurt access to quality generic drugs (Oxfam 2011).
2  
From the economic point of view, the harm of substandard or counterfeit drugs depends 
on whether consumers can tell drug quality from direct or indirect information. If poor-quality 
drugs can always pretend to be of high quality, consumers are deceived and manufacturers are 
discouraged to produce high-quality in the long run (Grossman and Shapiro 1988a). Regulatory 
enforcement of trademarks and quality standards could curb the proliferation of poor-quality 
                                                       
1 In an operation targeting online sale of counterfeit and illegal medicines, the World Customs Organization seized 
1,014,043 counterfeit pills worth approximately 2,598,163 US$ in one week of October 2010. The types of drugs 
seized (life-style drugs, antimalarials, sleeping pills, antibiotics, and heart medications, amongst others) show that 
the problem now affects all countries, developed and emerging.  
2 There is academic evidence that better intellectual property protection is associated with more R&D investment in 
pharmaceuticals or related diseases (Pazderka 1999, Lanjouw and Cockburn 2001) but none of these studies 
consider substandard drugs.  3 
 
drugs and reduce consumer fraud.
3 In contrast, a poor consumer may suspect low quality from 
the package or market cues, but still choose to purchase low price drugs in hope that low-price 
drugs will work sometimes and that is better than no treatment in expectation. In this case, the 
welfare consequence of a ban on low quality products is not so clear: on one hand, it may 
deprive the extremely poor of a treatment that sometimes works; on the other hand, consumer 
belief on the efficacy of substandard or counterfeit drugs is likely wrong and a misinformed 
choice could be worse than no purchase.   
More importantly, the issue of poor-quality drugs is not independent of drug affordability. 
According to WHO (2008), over 50 surveys have shown that drug prices are high in many low- 
and middle-income countries, with some treatments requiring over 15 days’ wages to purchase 
30 day supply. Public policies  –  for example tariff reduction, price  ceiling, and compulsory 
licensing of patented drugs – have tried to lower drug price, but buying potentially low-quality 
drugs is another way to fight against drug unaffordability, especially for the poor.       
This paper provides the first empirical study on the economics of poor-quality drugs with 
an emphasis on (1) the prevalence of poor-quality drugs in association with local regulation, 
income and literacy rate, and (2) the extent to which consumers can infer the likelihood of poor 
quality  from  market  price  and  appearance  of  pharmacy.  Drawing  insights  from  economic 
theories, we show that price and quality are fundamentally linked and the fight against poor-
quality drugs cannot be isolated from drug affordability.     
                                                       
3 It is important to note that not all counterfeits will breach a trademark. A drug that claims to be Ciprofloxacin on 
the package but contains chalk is “falsified” but breaks no intellectual property rules since it does not infringe a 




One reason for the limited literature on this topic is the lack of systematic data on poor 
quality medicines. To overcome this difficulty, we compiled original data on the price and quality 
of 899 drug samples across 17 developing and mid-income countries. In particular, our network 
of covert shoppers purchased 8 types of drugs from 185 private pharmacies and each collected 
drug sample went through three progressive tests ranging from visual inspection, disintegration 
and ingredient test, to Raman spectrometry test for the spectra of ingredients. We find that 15% 
of the drug samples fail the most stringent test (spectrometry). 
It  is  more  difficult  to  read  consumers'  mind  on  their  knowledge  of  drug  quality. 
According  to  Cockburn  et  al.  (2005),  many  pharmaceutical  companies  and  governments  are 
reluctant to publicize the problem of substandard and counterfeit drugs, fearing that the publicity 
will prevent patients from taking genuine medicines. Under such secrecy, consumer knowledge 
of drug quality is limited to self-inspection, word-of-mouth, and market cues. It is often difficult 
if not impossible to tell poor-quality drugs from packaging. In our data, only 3% of drug samples 
fail the visual test. Full information may not be available after consumption either, because drug 
effectiveness varies from person to person and even authentic drugs may not work well if the 
patient does not follow doctor's instruction. However, consumers may not be completely in the 
dark either: some quality information may be inferred from a large number of idiosyncratic cases 
and tied to observable attributes such as price and distributional channels.  
In our data, covert shoppers report their subjective assessment of whether the pharmacy 
looks “good” or “poor.” This assessment turns out to be correlated with our objective test results, 
but the correlation is low (with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.14 to 0.27 all with p-
value<0.001). In comparison, drug price is another way to reveal drug quality. After controlling 
for drug type, local regulations, income and literacy rate, we find that drugs that fail the most 
stringent  spectrometry  test  are  priced  13.6-18.7%  lower.  The  absolute  price  differential,  on 5 
 
average US$ 0.59 to 0.80 (per treatment course), could mean a big difference in local currencies. 
This suggests that buyers are likely to suspect low-quality when they pay less. 
Why is there a demand for likely inferior medicines? One possibility is that patients 
derive benefit from them because some inferior drugs work or give the impression of working 
due to a placebo effect without being harmful. Ignorance of pharmacology is another reason: less 
educated patients might buy cheap medicines because they incorrectly believe that if expensive 
medicines treat one quickly cheap low-quality medicines just take longer to work. Alternatively, 
a family living in extreme poverty may decide that buying cheap medicines is a risk worth taking 
rather than not taking any medicine at all. 
While poor-quality drugs are on average sold at a cheaper price, the price signal is far 
from complete. In our data, a large overlap exists between the price distributions of drugs that 
passed all the three quality tests and drugs that failed at least one test. Even after we control for 
drug type and local factors, the standard deviation of unexplained log price is 0.43 for non-
failing drugs and 0.37 for failing drugs, both larger than the average 0.17 difference between the 
two groups. Further calculation suggests that drugs sold at 37% lower than the average price are 
only 9.51 percentage points more likely to fail any test (25.66% vs. 14.14%), while drugs sold at 
36% higher than the average price are only 7.89 percentage points less likely to fail any test 
(6.25% vs. 14.14%). This suggests that the signaling effect of price is not as clear as the theory 
suggests: high price does not always guarantee high quality, and the existing price dispersion is 
likely to reflect market frictions in addition to the imperfect information of drug quality.  
For example, some non-failing drugs in our data are not innovator brands and they are 
priced more than 30% lower than innovator brands. As a result, the prices of these presumably 
true “generics” (act identically to innovator brands) overlap significantly with those of failing 
drugs. The inability to distinguish generics from inferior copies leaves some patients with the 6 
 
incorrect  impression  that  all  cheap  drugs  will  probably  work.  Such  impression  will  invite 
cheaters and further blur the signaling effect of price on quality.  This raises a concern that 
isolated efforts to lower drug price (e.g. by encouraging genuine generics) could worsen the fight 
against counterfeit and substandard drugs because they undermine the role of price in signaling.  
Even when price is able to signal quality, the difficulty to detect poor-quality products 
from  genuine  drugs  (from  non-price  information)  will  push  up  the  price  of  genuine  drugs 
because the expected price premium from high quality must exceed the temptation to cut corners 
(Wolinsky 1983, Shapiro 1982). To support this argument, we find that the price discount for 
failing drugs is greater in countries with lower-than-median literacy rate (25.8%) than in those of 
higher  literacy  rate  (12.3%),  after  controlling  for  local  factors  and  city  fixed  effects. These 
findings  highlight  the  fundamental  links  between  price  and  quality,  suggesting  that  public 
policies on price and quality must be coordinated.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the relatively 
limited economic literature on counterfeit/substandard goods and a separate medical literature on 
the  prevalence  of  poor-quality  drugs.  To  help  readers  understand  the  economics  behind 
theoretical  predictions,  we sketch the framework of Wolinsky (1983) and elaborate intuition 
behind each prediction. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents empirical models and 
results. Section VI concludes with a short discussion on our findings.  
 
II. Literature 
Economists have provided two theories about counterfeit goods depending on whether 
consumers know they are counterfeits before purchase (Grossman and Shapiro 1988a, 1988b). In 
the  first  theory,  consumers  are  imperfectly  informed  of  product  quality  and  are  unable  to 
distinguish genuine products from counterfeits. In this case, counterfeits are sold at the same 7 
 
price as authentic ones and a tougher policy against counterfeits enhances the total welfare, as 
consumers are less likely defrauded and honest producers are encouraged to produce quality 
products according to consumer demand (Grossman and Shapiro 1988a).   
In other markets, however, it is not clear that information asymmetry exists. Consumers 
may buy a product that they know, or at least strongly suspect, to be a fake. The sale of fake 
Gucci handbags, Samsonite luggage, and Pierre Cardin accessories at a fraction of the cost of 
legitimate products and from outlets that are clearly not official distribution outlets suggests that 
the buyer is likely aware that she is not buying an authentic product. In a separate equilibrium, 
Grossman and Shapiro (1988b) show that consumers may choose to pay for counterfeits at a 
price lower than that of brand-names but higher than that of outside options because they enjoy 
the  “status”  conveyed  by  a  counterfeit  of  brand  name.  Clearly,  the  psychological  benefit  of 
“status” does not apply to counterfeit drugs. However, Grossman and Shapiro’s analysis can be 
extended to a patient buying a cheaper (and on average less efficacious) product as long as 
consumers believe such products can be effective with a positive probability. Why such a belief 
exists in equilibrium is another question that we will return to later on.  
A broader theoretical literature considers low- and high-quality products even if the low-
quality ones do not appear in the form of counterfeits. The analogy to our context is that some 
low quality drugs are substandard because legitimate manufacturers secretly cut corners or the 
well-manufactured  drugs  were  inappropriately  stored  in  the  distribution  process.  Wolinsky 
(1983) shows a unique equilibrium where price completely reveals product quality although the 
exact  quality  chosen  by  a  firm  is  known  only  to  the  firm  itself  initially.  Below  we  recast 
Wolinsky's  model  in  the  context  of  substandard  drugs.  Interested  readers  should  refer  to 
Wolinsky (1983) for proof.  8 
 
Consider a competitive drug market where the drug can be produced at different quality 
levels, all consumers prefer high to low quality, consumers differ in their willingness to pay for 
quality, and it is more costly to produce better quality. The actual quality of a drug is only known 
to the manufacturer, but some noisy information about drug quality such as the look of the 
package is available to some consumers with zero cost.   
In this setting, it is possible to have a separate equilibrium where every price reveals a 
unique quality level but price must exceed the marginal cost of the signaled quality (except for 
the lowest quality). Otherwise, a manufacturer will have incentive to secretly cut quality and earn 
positive profit from cheating. Another necessary condition is that some consumers must have 
free access to some (imperfect) information about product quality other than price. When a firm 
charges price p but provides quality lower than what p signals in equilibrium, some consumers 
will shy away from the product because they have access to (imperfect) information of drug 
quality. The  expected  sales  reduction  discourages  cheating  as  profit  from  honest  production 
exceeds the potential profit of cheating. In other words, a signaling equilibrium must entail some 
negative  consequence  of  cheating  and  consumer  access  to  (imperfect)  information  is  the 
mechanism to generate such negative consequence in Wolinsky's model. Other researchers have 
shown the same insight in different settings where the negative consequence of cheating may 
arise from lower reputation and fewer repeat sales (Shapiro 1982, Klein and Leffler 1981).   
More importantly, the extent to which price exceeds marginal cost depends on the nature 
of consumer information. The poorer the information is, the less negative consequence there is 
for cheating. To counter the increased temptation to  cheat, there must be higher profit from 
honest production, which implies higher mark up in the signaling equilibrium. Note that this 
insight is different from the observation that price is higher for higher quality when consumers 
have perfect information about product quality (without inference from price). In that case, price 9 
 
difference only reflects cost difference (assuming the market is competitive and every one has 
equal  access  to  production  technology).  But  when  consumer  information  is  imperfect,  price 
difference includes not only the cost difference but also the mark up difference, the latter of 
which increases with the imperfection of consumer information.  
  Above  all,  we  have  two  theoretical  predictions  in  a  signaling  equilibrium:  (1)  if 
consumers can infer product quality from price, price is a monotone function of quality; and (2)  
if price signals quality, the price difference between high and low qualities is smaller when 
consumers have access to better information about quality (besides price).  
  The reality of medicines is more complicated than theory. On the one hand, consumers 
may not be completely fooled because they may inspect the packaging of a drug and observe 
drug performance from personal experience or comments from friends and colleagues. This has 
already been captured in the above theory. On the other hand, price may not have a one-to-one 
correspondence to drug quality because many other reasons lead to price dispersion: search cost 
on price information alone may generate price dispersion (Stigler 1961), so do cost differences in 
production or distribution. To the extent that consumers cannot differentiate these confounding 
factors from price, they may form a rational belief that low price signals a high probability of 
low quality but low (high) price does not confirm low (high) quality.  In this sense, providing 
quality information directly may complement the imperfect function of price signals, reduce the 
price-cost  markup  for  authentic  drugs,  and  facilitate  consumer  shopping  for  affordable 
medicines.  
  Another factor that is not considered in Wolinsky (1983) but may affect equilibrium price 
and quality is price control regulation. Atella, Bhattacharya and Carbonari (2008) examine drug 
price  and  quality  outcomes  under  minimum  quality  standard  and  price  control  regulations. 
Although they do not consider counterfeit drugs and assume consumers have perfect information 10 
 
about drug quality, their model predicts that price control reduces the price difference between 
high  and  low  quality  drugs,  reduces  the  average  drug  quality  available  on  the  market,  and 
weakens the positive correlation between price and quality. The second and third predictions are 
further confirmed using data from US and Italy.  Like in Wolinsky (1983), these findings suggest 
that price and quality must be considered jointly in the drug market.   
 Existing medical studies focus on detecting the existence of substandard or counterfeit 
drugs. Given the difficulty in obtaining cooperation from local manufacturers and regulators, 
medical researchers often acquire a small sample of drugs and have them tested in the lab for 
quality (not trademark violation). For example, Dondorp et al. (2004) find that 53% of the 188 
tablet packs purchased in Southeast Asia under the label of artesunate (an antimalarial drug) did 
not contain any artesunate. This quality problem, caused primarily by counterfeits, has increased 
significantly as  compared to  an earlier survey in the same area  (38%  of 108 drug samples, 
Newton  et  al.  2001).  A  more  recent  study  (WHO  2009)  acquired  a  larger  sample  of  491 
antimalarials from Africa, adopted more comprehensive laboratory test procedures, and found 
high failure rates (10-54%) in all of the three sample countries.  
Our data generation process follows the same rationale as in the medical literature, but we 
cover a broader range of drugs (8 including antimalarials, antibiotics and anti-mycobacterials), 
more source countries (17 including low- and mid-income ones), and three levels of quality tests. 
Greater regional variations in our data allow a better understanding as to how the presence of 
substandard and counterfeit drug associates with local regulations, income and literacy rate. We 
also restrict sampling to regular pharmacies excluding kiosks, bus vendors, or other types of drug 
sellers, so our estimate of failure rate is not directly comparable to that in the literature.   
        More importantly, our data include purchase price for 899 drug samples. These prices, 
combined with the objective lab test results on drug quality, help measure the extent to which 11 
 
consumers can infer poor quality from cheap price. Although economic theories highlight the 
importance  of  market  price  in  quality  revelation,  most  existing  studies  on  price-quality 
relationship are not specific to substandard or counterfeit drugs. Studies have shown that generic 
drugs  are  significantly  cheaper  than  innovator  brands  but  both  types  are  authentic  and  bio-
equivalent. For instance, Rizzo and Zeckhauser  (2005) show that the first  generic entrant  is 
priced roughly 25% lower than its brand-name competitor. With subsequent generics entrants, 
the price of generics declines rapidly. However, brand-name producers do not necessarily lower 
their price in response to generic entry (Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 1991; Grabowski and 
Vernon 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997). We are aware of three economic studies on counterfeits, 
but none of them focus on drugs. Based on a field experiment on eBay, Jin and Kato (2006) show 
that price and quality of sportscards can be negatively related if consumers are misled by high 
quality claims from low-quality sellers. It turned out that such high-claim cards are more likely 
to  be  counterfeits.  Using  a  natural  experiment  in  Chinese  shoe  market,  Qian  (2008;  2011) 
presents evidence that brands with less government protection differentiate their products from 
counterfeits by innovation, self-enforcement, vertical integration of downstream retailers, and 
subtle high-price signals.   
Above all, we believe this paper is the first effort to study price-quality relationship for 
substandard and counterfeit drugs. Although policy makers have emphasized drug affordability 
and quality control separately, we show that these two dimensions are fundamentally linked and 
must be considered together.   
 
III. Data 
III.1 Data description 12 
 
Over the past three years (2008-2010), we created networks of covert shoppers across 
cities and countries to help collect medicines.
4 In the study sample, medicines were procured by 
these local covert shoppers from 185 private pharmacies across 17 developing and mid-income 
countries. In particular, covert shoppers helped identify non-slum, middle class areas of their city 
and then took a random walk through those areas collecting samples from regular pharmacies 
excluding kiosks, bus vendors and other types of drug sellers where quality may be lower. On 
entering the pharmacy they asked the pharmacist or shop assistant to show them all the drugs 
sold  to  treat malaria, TB  and bacterial infections,  which they  required for their  family. The 
primary aim was to act as any other shopper
5, they therefore would listen to the advice of the 
pharmacist  if  it  was  given,  and  then  randomly  select  products  if  a  significant  choice  was 
available, buying three products (or fewer if only one or two were available) of each drug type in 
each location.
6  It is not uncommon for people to home treat without prescription, particularly in 
Africa where visiting a doctor is difficult and expensive, so ensuring a supply of antimalarials 
and antibiotics is normal.  Following this protocol we believe we can compare one city with 
another but a more precise stratification would have required far greater knowledge of each city 
than we had.  
Samplings took place in eleven African cities, three Indian cities, and five cities from 
mid-income countries. All of the eight drug types were from the World Health Organization’s 
essential  medicines  list,  including  antimalarials,  antibiotics  and  anti-mycobacterials  (for  the 
                                                       
4 Covert shoppers were selected based on their citizenship and knowledge of the cities chosen for study. All were 
compensated financially for helping collect samples.  
5 There was not a single incidence where a pharmacist balked at the request, although it is of course possible they 
were suspicious and changed the products sold as a result. This implies that the failure rate found in our sample may 
be an underestimate of the actual failure rate.     
6 Note that all the drugs were purchased without a prescription. In no case did the lack of a prescription prevent a 
drug sale. It is not clear whether there are laws requiring pharmacists to only sell drugs if a prescription is available 
in the sampled countries and cities. If there are such laws, they were not being followed by pharmacies or enforced 




7 With the exception of ciprofloxacin, a widely used antibiotic, no 
other drug was available in every location. Indeed, no antimalarials were available for purchase 
from the cities of Istanbul, Sao Paolo and Moscow.  To ensure comparability, we bought the most 
standard formulations. All of the samples were tablets, most in blister packages, which are the 
easiest products to store and hence proliferate in emerging markets.
8  
All medicines were assessed in three types of tests. The first is a visual inspection of 
packaging  and  pills  for  correctness.  The  second  type  of  tests,  referred  to  as  minilab  tests, 
includes disintegration test for basic solubility and semi-quantitative thin-layer chromatography 
(TLC) for the presence and relative concentration of active ingredients. Both visual and minilab 
tests follow the Global Pharma Health Fund e.V. Minilab® protocol to identify substandard, 
degraded or counterfeit medicines.  
The third type of test is a Raman spectrometry test for product authentication. Unlike the 
Minilab tests, which test for a specific attribute of a drug, a spectrometer provides a spectra of 
the entire treatment, including active ingredients, binding agents, dyes and other “excipients”. 
The spectra can be compared against a known genuine version of the drug (like comparing 
fingerprints), or for analyzing the presence of specific ingredients, since each ingredient will 
likely have its own unique peak in the spectra. In this sense, it is more stringent than visual and 
minilab tests.  All the tests were conducted with the Africa Fighting Malaria Minilab in the 
United Kingdom within 60 days of purchase.  
                                                       
7 Our aim was to pick essential drugs to combat serious infections and for diseases that are generally home treated 
in poor nations. It may be tempting to classify the eight drug types into the categories of acute or chronic drugs, but 
the distinction is not as easy as it seems. Malaria can be an acute condition, so is TB at the margin. Even if we could 
classify drugs by acute and chronic, it is not clear the difference is driven by acute versus chronic rather than some 
other attributes that differ across the eight drug types. For this reason, in the regression we use drug fixed effects as 
pure controls.  
8 Many of the sampled drugs were imported, fewer were locally made. However, since some of them may be 
counterfeits, it is difficult to assess whether the labeled manufacturer source is the actual source. 14 
 
Minilab tests were run in duplicate, with the generous assumption that the result more 
consistent with the reference was recorded. Quality control of the Minilab was performed daily 
prior to testing and consisted of performing TLC on Minilab-reference samples for the medicine 
classes being analyzed. In addition, Minilab reagents were quality control tested using reference 
samples when a new lot was introduced. The Minilab protocol awards medicines a “pass” for 
active ingredient (by TLC) if they have 80% or more of the labeled active ingredient(s). For 
fixed-dose combinations and sulphadoxine–pyrimethamine, a “pass” was awarded only if both 
active  ingredients  met  this  standard.  The  spectrometry  tests  were  conducted  with  a  Raman 
Spectrometer, to assess sample spectra against approved versions of the medicines, or at the least 
to check that the spectra of the active ingredient was present.  
Some  of  these  pharmacological  data  have  been  previously  published  in  the  literature 
(Bate et  al.  2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a;  Bate  and Hess  2010). We do not  have  access  to  a 
compendial laboratory to assess all possible problems with medicines, hence some medicines 
could pass all of the above tests but still fail certain tests for solubility, permeability, product 
degradation, trace element contamination and pathogenic contamination. In other words if a drug 
fails one of the above tests it is definitely substandard, but if it passes it may be a higher quality, 
but still far from perfect medicine.  
While we can establish whether the drug fails the tests or not, we cannot control for all 
the causes for why the drug may fail. As mentioned earlier, some products are counterfeits, but 
other causes for drug failures include quality control failures at a legitimate manufacturer or poor 
storage along the distribution chain. As such, our measure of drug failure may capture some 
cases of genuine drugs being identified as inferior products.  That being said, by buying from 
real pharmacies instead of rural traders, kiosks or bus vendors, the sampled drugs were more 15 
 
likely to be stored well. Another reason for storage not being a major issue for our sample is that 
a few well-known brands have no quality problems in any of the sample locations.
9   
The price information is less comprehensive than the quality data. Given the initial aim of 
the drug quality project was to establish quality, not all of the initial covert buyers (residents of 
each city) kept all of the receipts they received. In some instances receipts were illegible, and in 
some, they were simply not given by the medicine seller. Nevertheless price data are available 
for 899 drugs that went through all the quality tests. All prices are nominal and converted to US 
dollars  according  to  the  exchange  rate  as  of  the  purchase  date.  For  malaria  and  bacterial 
infections, price is reported per treatment pack, i.e. the dose presumed to cure the disease. For 
TB, price is reported for one uniform package. In the sampling process, we ensured that the 
packs procured were directly comparable in terms of treatment course. Since most cities only 
appear in our data for one year, city fixed effects will absorb most of the unobserved inflation. In 
addition to price and quality data, we also  collect covert shoppers’ subjective assessment of 
pharmacy appearance. By definition, this assessment is binary (good or poor) and subjective, but 
it provides direct evidence on consumer knowledge about product quality, which is an important 
factor in the signaling equilibrium as discussed above. 
The main data described above are supplemented with data on local drug regulations, 
income  and  literacy  rate.  We  believe  local  regulations  are  related  to  the  price  and  cost  of 
substandard  and  counterfeit  drugs,  while  income  and  literacy  rate  are  likely  to  affect  both 
demand and cost of supply. Specifically, we obtain male and female adult literacy rates for ages 
15 and over from the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP 2009). They are country-
specific and were compiled by UNESCO from censuses and surveys conducted between 1999 
and 2007. We take the average of female and male literacy rates as they are highly correlated 
                                                       
9 For example, one of the prominent brands of ACT for which we had 43 samples, showed no quality problems 
across locations. 16 
 
(correlation coefficient = 0.89). One may argue that females are more likely to purchase drugs 
for  the  family  and  therefore  female  literacy  rate  may  matter  more  than  male  literacy  rate. 
Unfortunately, we do not have systematic measure on city-specific gender composition in drug 
purchase, but robustness checks find that using male, female or average literacy rate generates 
similar results. Literacy rate is available for all countries except for Ethiopia and Turkey.   
The year- and city-specific GDP per capita data are denominated in US$ according to the 
exchange rate as of the purchase time. Another way to measure price and GDP per capita is by 
purchase  power  parity  (PPP).  Since  the  regression  results  are  similar  when  we  switch  both 
measures to PPP, we only report results for which price and GDP are measured by exchange rate. 
The  GDP  per  capita  data  were  constructed  using  the  2008  city  GDP  estimates  by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC 2009) and the 2009 and 2010 city population estimates from the 
2009 revision of the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects Report (UN 2009). We extended the 
2008  GDP  estimates  to  2009  and  2010  using  country  level  GDP  growth  rates  from  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). We extended the city population estimates backwards to 
2008  using  the  UN  report’s  2005–2010  average  population  growth  figure.  For  Istanbul, 
Lubumbashi,  Kigali,  Kampala,  and  Lusaka,  city-level  data  was  not  available  and  we  used 
country-level GDP per capita from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database as of October 
2010 (IMF 2010). After these procedures, GDP per capita data are available for all countries.  
We include four variables to capture local drug regulations: one is whether a drug has 
been  registered  in  the  purchase  country  or  not. As  shown  in  Oxfam  (2011)  and  Bate  et  al. 
(2010b), drug registration is the most primitive regulation on legitimate drugs but its availability 
and implementation vary greatly across countries.  Using drug registration data collected in Bate 
et al. (2010a and 2010b), we created a dummy variable equal to one if a drug has been registered 
in  the purchase country at  the purchase time. To the extent that drug registration represents 17 
 
minimum quality requirement, the model of Atella, Bhattacharya and Carbonari (2008) predicts 
higher quality in countries with drug registration. 
Some countries impose import tariff, sales taxes and other duties on ethical drugs, we 
borrow country-specific tax and duties from Bate, Tren and Urbach (2006). They are the average 
Taxes  and  Duties  applied  to  Chapter  29  (active  pharmaceutical  ingredients)  and  Chapter  30 
(finished  pharmaceutical)  products  in  2006,  by  country.  This  variable  is  available  for  10 
countries, accounting for 735 of the 899 drug samples.
10  By definition, we expect higher price in 
countries with higher tariff and taxes but it is difficult to predict how these duties affect drug 
quality: on one hand, tariff and other duties may prompt government officials to take a closer 
look  at  the  drugs;  on  the  other  hand,  high  price  may  invite  counterfeit  and  substandard 
production.  
The third regulatory variable is the number of months a person will be sentenced in 
prison if he is found guilty for counterfeiting drugs. We hand collected minimum and maximum 
penalty from the latest legal documents we can find in each country. For example, Egyptian IP 
Law sets down a number of penalties, including prison terms, for persons making or selling 
counterfeit goods. Monetary penalties range from $90 to $9,000, and terms of imprisonment 
range from 2 months to 3 years. Prison terms are mandatory only for repeat offenses.
11 In July 
2008, the Indian cabinet approved a bill that increases fines for convicted counterfeiters from 
USD$250 to a minimum of USD$22,550 or three times the value of the drugs confiscated. They 
also increased the jail sentences for those convicted of counterfeiting from 5 years to a minimum 
of 10 years to life.
12 To accommodate diverse sentencing guidelines, monetary fines are coded as 
                                                       
9 Please refer to Bate, Tren and Urbach (2006) for detailed data description, as different types of tax duties come 
from different data sources.  
 
10 Available at: http://www.notofakes.com/Resources/TravelAdvisory/Africa/Egypt/tabid/495/Default.aspx. 
 
11 Available at: http://cdsco.nic.in/Guidelines%20under%20new%20penal%20provisions.pdf. 18 
 
zero month and death penalty is coded as 360 months (30 years). We use maximum penalty in 
the data. This variable is available for 12 countries, accounting for 691 of the 899 drug samples. 
It is difficult to predict the correlation between penalty and the presence of poor-quality drugs: 
penalty should increase the negative consequence of counterfeit and substandard production, but 
penalty may be higher in response to serious problems in drug quality.  
The last regulatory variable indicates the presence of direct price regulations such as 
price ceilings, mandatory retail price, and price guidance. We hand collected these regulations 
from  each  country’s  most  recent  government  documents.  Given  the  wide  variety  of  price 
regulations,  we  define  a  binary  variable  equal  to  one  if  a  country  has  adopted  any  price 
regulation  on  pharmaceuticals  in  the  data  collect  year  and  zero  otherwise.  This  variable  is 
available for 10 of the 19 cities, accounting for 554 of the 899 observations.  According to Atella, 
Bhattacharya and Carbonari (2008), price control regulations should reduce the average quality 
available in the market, reduce price difference between high and low qualities, and weaken the 
correlation between price and quality. Evidence has shown that price control regulation can lead 
to lower price and more drug consumption (Danzon 1997). However, Anis and Wen (1998) and 
Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b)  suggest that price control regulation could raise market price 
in some cases.  
 
III.2 Data Summary 
  Focusing on the 899 drug samples with both price and quality data, Table 1 provides a 
summary  of  key  variables.  Overall,  the  sample  includes  79  observations  on  Artemsisin 
Combination  Therapies  (ACTs),  79  on  Artemisinin  monotherapies  (Artmono),  69  on 




Chloroquine  (CQ),  185  on  Ciprofloxacin,  146  on  Isoniazid,  168  on  Rifampicin,  78  on 
Sulphadoxine/Pyrimethamine (SP) and 119 on Erythromycin. The Appendix describes each type 
of drug, the dosages used, as well as the type of illness it treats.  It also presents the definition of 
the three quality tests.  
  Visual appearance test is the first screening tool used to monitor for substandard and 
counterfeit  products:  one  can  spot  spelling  mistakes  and  other  errors  (wrong  fonts,  inks, 
pagination etc.) and where possible compare with an example of a genuine version. Nearly 97 
percent of the drugs passed the visual test. Approximately 89 percent of drugs passed the minilab 
(disintegration and chromatography) tests, and 85 percent passed the spectrometry test. The three 
tests are progressive: 29 of the 31 samples that fail the visual test also fail the minilab tests; and 
all the drugs that fail the minlab tests fail the spectrometry test.  
  In  short,  we  have  approximately  15  percent  of  sampled  drugs  that  failed  the  most 
stringent spectrometry test. This number approximates common perceptions about the percent of 
fake drugs circulating in the market (for instance, see Cockburn and Newton, 2005), but is lower 
than many studies for the worst areas of Africa and Southeast Asia, perhaps indicating our focus 
on regular pharmacies which tend to provide better quality than other vendors. The average drug 
price for our sample was $4.26 with a minimum value of .078 (for CQ) and a maximum of $48.9 
(for ciprofloxacin).  
Conditional on data availability, approximately 89 percent of the drugs were registered in 
the country in which they were sold, the average adult literacy rate is 81 percent, the length of 
the penalty for counterfeiting is 233 months, and the total tariffs and taxes are on average 12 
percent.  Unlike previous medical studies on a specific part of the world, our data cover a wide 
range of GDP per capita, from US$ 193.79 in Lubumbashi, Congo (2010) to US$ 19208.18 in 
Moscow, Russia (2010).   20 
 
  Table 2 provides a slightly more disaggregated look at the data. It shows for each city and 
each year, the average pass rate of drugs for different types of test. For instance, the highest pass 
rates for drugs were in Istanbul in 2010 where 35 drugs passed all tests successfully and Sao 
Paolo in 2010, with 32 drugs passing both visual and minilab tests and 97 percent passing the 
spectrometry result. The lowest pass rates were for Lubumbashi in 2010 where only 60 percent 
of the drugs passed the spectrometry test but in this case only 10 drugs were sampled. The lowest 
pass rate for a reasonable size sample was from Nairobi, where only  70 percent passed the 
spectrometry test in the 2010 sample. 
  Table 2 also shows the unusual structure of our data. While we observe most drugs and 
accordingly their prices in multiple years, most cities from which the samples are taken are only 
observed  in  a  single  year. The  only  exceptions  are  Delhi  (observed  in  2008  and  2010)  and 
Nairobi (observed in 2009 and 2010). India is the only country from which we sampled more 
than one city.
13 This structure suggests that the sample is largely a pooled cross-section. If we 
control for city fixed effects, the effect of GDP per capita, literacy rate and local regulations will 
only be identified by variations within Delhi and Nairobi.   
In addition to countries and cities, the data identify 185 unique pharmacies, each of which 
corresponds to at least two types of drugs. This structure allows us to control for unobserved 
pharmacy attributes by pharmacy fixed effects. Moreover, every covert shopper reported whether 
he/she assessed the look of the pharmacy “good” or “poor”.  This subjective opinion will help us 
measure  the  extent  to  which  the  “look”  of  a  pharmacy  signals  drug  quality  to  a  cautious 
consumer. If consumers infer drug quality from the look of the pharmacies and a better-looking 
pharmacy is more likely to charge a higher price, a regression not accounting for pharmacy 
                                                       
12 To account for within-India variation, we obtain GDP data at the state level (higher than a city). 
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identity  may  mistakenly  attribute  the  signaling  effect  to  price.  Inversely,  if  price  remains 
significantly  correlated  with  quality  after  we  control  for  pharmacy  fixed  effects  or  shopper 
assessment, it is clear that price has a separate signaling effect in addition to the look or other 
attributes of pharmacies.  The degree to which covert shoppers' subjective assessment predicts 
the actual lab results will also highlight the nature of consumer information as discussed in the 
theoretical literature.  
  Table 3 shows variable averages when we split the sample into failing and non-failing 
drugs, where failing is defined as failing any of the three tests. The most interesting observation 
is the difference in drug prices. The average price in the non-failing sample was more than 75% 
higher than the average price in the failing sample. The regression results in the next section will 
further confirm that the price difference remains statistically significant when we control for 
local regulations, income, literacy rate, city fixed effects or even pharmacy fixed effects. Other 
interesting results from the comparison are higher degree of product registration, higher fraction 
of innovator brands and better pharmacy assessment for non-failing drugs. Moreover, non-failing 
drugs are more likely to appear in countries with higher adult literacy rates, higher income levels 
and price regulations.  
  Figure  1  plots  the  kernel  densities  of  log(price)  for  failing  and  non-failing  drugs. 
Consistent with Table 3, the average price of non-failing drugs is higher than that of failing 
drugs,  but  both  distributions  are  dispersed  and  have  a  large  overlap  with  each  other.  This 
suggests that any signaling effect that price has on drug quality may be far from complete. We 
will test this more rigorously in Section IV.  
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  Our empirical analysis consists of three parts: first, we show how local drug regulations, 
income and literacy rate correlate with whether a sample drug fails any quality test. This does not 
represent any causal relationship but could be informative to policy makers given the on-going 
debate on anti-counterfeit policies. The second part of the analysis focuses on price-quality 
relationship. To test the two predictions shown in Section II, we examine whether failing drugs 
are on average sold at lower prices than non-failing drugs. We also compare this price difference 
to the unexplained price variations, and test whether the difference in average price varies by 
adult literacy. The last part of this section examines whether shopper’s subjective assessment on 
the look of pharmacies correlates with our quality test results and whether the price difference 
between high and low quality drugs is driven by the look of pharmacies instead of the true 
signaling effect of price.   
  
IV.1 The prevalence of poor-quality drugs 
Denoting i as a specific drug sample, d as drug type , c as city, and t as year, we run the 
following probit regression: 
 𝑃𝐴??𝑖??? = 1  
𝑖?      ?? + ?? + [??] + ?1??𝑃𝑃??? + ?2𝐿𝑖????𝑎???? + ?3𝐼????𝑎???𝑖??? 
            +?4𝑃??????𝑖????? + ?5?𝑎?𝑃???? + ?6???𝑎??𝑎??? + ?7𝑃?𝑖?????? + 𝜀𝑖??? > 0 
where 
𝑃𝐴?? = a dummy equal to one if sample i passes a specific quality test, 
?? = drug type fixed effects, total 8 dummies, 
?? = city fixed effects, total 19 dummies, 23 
 
?? = year fixed effects, total 3 dummies
14, 
?????𝑃𝑃? = log (GDP per capita), in US$, 
𝐿𝑖????𝑎?? = adult literacy rate in percentage points, 
𝑃??????𝑖?? = a dummy equal to one if the drug that sample i intends to be has been 
registered in the purchase country, 
?𝑎?𝑃?? = max # of months in prison if caught counterfeiting drugs, 
???𝑎??𝑎? = total tariff and tax for the drug that sample i intends to be, in percentage 
points. 
𝑖????𝑎??? = 1 if the drug intends to be an innovator brand, 
𝑃?𝑖????? =. 1 if the country has price regulations on pharmaceuticals in the study year. 
In theory, stricter regulations on drug quality should raise the cost of substandard or 
counterfeit production, thus increasing the probability that our drug samples pass the quality 
tests. This implies ?4 > 0, ?5 > 0.  Predications on ?3, ?6 and ?7 are less clear: high import 
tariffs, no price regulation and the status of innovator brands may imply higher drug price thus 
inviting counterfeits, but it is also likely that innovator brand holders devote more efforts to 
brand protection by hiring investigators, pursuing counterfeiters and making the package harder 
to imitate. It is also possible that price regulations limit the range of mark up (i.e. price – cost) 
thus reducing the potential reward for high quality drugs which implies more drug failures. 
Table 4 reports four sets of results for the above probit regression: Column (1) focuses on 
whether a drug sample passes the visual appearance test, Column (2) on the combined Minilab 
tests (disintegration and chromatography), Column (3) on the spectrometry test; and Column (4) 
adds city fixed effects to Column (3). In theory, we could include pharmacy fixed effects but we 
                                                       
14 Including all three full sets of fixed effects will create collinearity. Stata-implemented regressions will 
automatically drop two dummies in two of the three sets to avoid collinearity problem. 24 
 
choose not to because pharmacy identity predicts many outcomes perfectly which leaves the 
estimation sample much smaller than that without pharmacy fixed effects. Note that failing any 
of the three tests is equivalent to failing the spectrometry test because that is the most stringent 
one.  All results are presented as marginal effects, with robust standard errors clustered by city.  
Across all columns, it is clear that registered drugs are more likely to pass any test. 
Moreover, drugs of innovator brands are more likely to pass minilab and spectrometry tests, and 
drugs with higher taxes and duties are more likely to fail these two tests. The correlations 
between test results and price regulations are less clear: the presence of price regulations tends to 
be associated with lower passing rate for visual appearance but higher passing rates for the other 
tests. Maximum penalty for counterfeiting drugs is significantly correlated with minilab and 
spectrometry tests but with a counterintuitive negative sign. This reflects the possibility that 
countries with severe counterfeit problems may adopt harsher penalties.  Note that registered 
drugs and innovator brands continue to be positively related to passing the tests even after we 
add city fixed effects, as they are country-drug-year specific. The other regulatory variables 
(taxes, maximum penalty, price regulations) drop off Column (4) because they only vary by city.  
Compared to Table 3, GDP per capita is not significantly correlated with test results 
(except for Column 4 which is identified from variations within Delhi and Nairobi) but countries 
with higher adult literacy rates tend to pass the tests more.  
Above all, the most robust result from Table 4 is that both product registration and 
innovator brands are strongly correlated with better drug quality.  
 
IV.2 Price-Quality Relationship 
We examine price-quality relationship in the following specification: 25 
 
?????????𝑖??𝑖???
= ?? + ?? + [??] + [??] + ??𝑎𝑖?𝐴??????𝑖??? + ?1??𝑃𝑃???
+ ?2𝐿𝑖????𝑎???? + ?3𝐼????𝑎???𝑖??? + ?4𝑃??????𝑖????? + ?5?𝑎?𝑃??? 
+ ?6???𝑎??𝑎?? + ?7𝑃?𝑖?????? + 𝜖𝑖??? 
 where  
?? = pharmacy fixed effects,  
?𝑎𝑖?𝐴?????? = 1 if sample i fails any of the three tests,  
and the other variables are described above. We use log of drug price instead of price itself as the 
dependent variable, because drug price is highly skewed and the distribution of log price is much 
closer to normal distributions as shown in Figure 1.  If price provides an effective signal of 
whether a drug passes any quality test, we expect ? < 0. Table 5 reports three sets of OLS 
results, with progressive addition of city fixed effects in column (2) and pharmacy fixed effects 
in column (3). All regressions allow robust standard errors clustered by city.  
As expected, drugs are more expensive if consumers are richer or better educated, or if 
the drug is of innovator brand, registered, subject to high taxes and duties, and not directly 
regulated in price. Nevertheless, drugs that fail at least one of our quality tests are priced 21.4% 
lower  in  Column  (1)  and  13.6-18.7%  lower  (which  corresponds  to  US$0.59-0.80)  after  the 
addition of city fixed effects or pharmacy fixed effects. This suggests that unobservable attributes 
such as city-specific regulation enforcement or pharmacy service do not explain most of the price 
discount for poor-quality drugs. In other words, consumers could have suspected lower quality 
from lower price.  
Suppose the 13.6-18.7% price discount does signal poor quality drugs, how effective is 
the signal? This will depend on how drug price varies by other factors. These factors are likely in 
our error term as we cannot control for all the information that a consumer may observe in the 26 
 
local market. In light of this, we use an iterated general least square (GLS) procedure to estimate 
the standard error of the unexplained log price variations for both failing and non-failing drugs 
separately.   The estimates are reported in the bottom row of Table 5.
15  
Before we add city or pharmacy fixed effects, the standard error of unexplained log price 
variations is 0.43 for non-failing drugs and 0.37 for failing drugs, both much bigger than the 
0.136-0.187 difference in the average log price between the two groups. While city heterogeneity 
and pharmacy heterogeneity are able to reduce the unexplained log price variations, the 
remaining variations are still large relative to the average price difference.  
Figures 2-4 plot the kernel density of log price of non-failing and failing drugs after we 
exclude the price variations explained by the regressions in Table 5. The average log price of 
non-failing drugs is normalized as zero. All the three sets of comparisons (no city fixed effects, 
with city fixed effects, and with pharmacy fixed effects) show a huge overlap in the two price 
distributions. This suggests that the 13.6-18.7% difference in average price, though statistically 
significant, is not enough to ensure that consumers always infer poor quality from lower price. In 
fact, if we use the first set of log price distributions (i.e. no city fixed effects) to compute the 
probability of a drug failing any test by brackets of price, we find that drugs sold at 37% lower 
than the average price are only 9.51 percentage points (or 81%) more likely to fail any test 
(25.66% vs. 14.14%), while drugs sold at 36% higher than the average price are only 7.89 
percentage points (55.8%) less likely to fail any test (6.25% vs. 14.14%). 
Figures 5-6 follow the logic of Figures 2-3 (without and with city fixed effects) but we 
separate the price distributions of non-failing drugs into innovator brands and non-innovator 
brands. Assuming non-failing non-innovator brands are true generics, it is clear that the price 
                                                       
15 Because GLS assumes the variance of error is the same conditional on failing on non-failing drugs, the estimated 
coefficients are not identical to what we reported in Table 5. However, all coefficients only differ in the third 
decimal points and there is no change in the statistical significance.   27 
 
signal (on drug quality) is noisier for generics. The coefficient of innovator brands as reported in 
Table 5 indicates that innovator brands are on average 33.6-37.1% more expensive than generics. 
Combined with the facts that innovator brands have a tighter price distribution and are less likely 
to fail any test, this suggests that either the high price (hence higher future profit from high 
quality) discourages innovators from cheating or the innovators have more resources to seek self-
policing and government protection.  
Above all, we show that drugs that fail at least one of the quality tests are priced 13.6-
18.7% lower on average, however the price dispersion is so large that consumers cannot ensure 
high quality by high price alone. In the strictest form, this rejects the first prediction as described 
in Section II. Now we turn to test the second prediction that in a signaling equilibrium the price 
difference between low- and high-quality drugs should increase with the imperfection of quality 
information that consumers have free access to in the local market (in addition to price). 
 Empirically, it is difficult to measure consumer access to quality information, so we 
search for rough proxies. To the extent that a literate consumer can at least read labels on a drug 
package, one may argue that consumers in a city with higher literacy rates have better ability to 
identify poor quality drugs. In light of this, Table 6 presents two sets of results: in the first two 
columns, we estimate two separate coefficients of failing any test depending on whether the adult 
literacy rate is below 67.5% (sample median); in the remaining four columns, we split the sample 
by above- or below-median literacy rate and rerun the price specification for the two subsamples 
separately. We report results with and without city fixed effects for robustness check.  
As expected from the theory, Table 6 shows that the price discount for failing drugs is 
larger in low-literacy cities (25.3-27.8%) than in high-literacy cities (12.3-16.0%). Moreover, 
results in Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the average discount we have seen in Table 5 for the 
full sample is driven by the deep discount in low-literacy cities. This finding is largely consistent 28 
 
with the theoretical argument that more information friction on the consumer side pushes up the 
mark up for high-quality drugs, which in turn makes good-quality drugs less affordable to 
consumers. When we repeat the above exercise for the observations with higher-than-median 
GDP per capita and the rest of the sample, we find that the discount difference between the high 
and low GDP groups is much smaller (20.3% in high GDP cities and 22.1% in low GDP cities).  
While we should be cautious in interpreting income versus literacy in our small sample of cities 
(the two are correlated), the above results suggest that the affordability of legitimate drugs is 
more likely tied with drug quality through consumer ability to detect bad quality than with GDP 
levels per se.  
 
IV.3   Can consumers tell poor-quality drugs from the look of the pharmacy? 
Evidence presented so far shows that poor-quality drugs are sold at significantly lower 
prices on average but the signaling effect of price is far from complete. A related question is 
whether consumers can infer drug quality from other market cues. One candidate is the type of 
distribution channels, as some brand-name manufacturers in other contexts have used 
downstream distribution outlets to fight against counterfeits (Qian 2008; 2010). The control of 
pharmacy fixed effects in Table 5 confirms that average price remains significantly lower for 
failing drugs no matter what inference a typical consumer could draw from the look of a 
pharmacy. However, pharmacy fixed effects could capture many unobservables in addition to 
consumer perception of a pharmacy, so it is still interesting to examine the perceived look of 
pharmacies explicitly.  
Our data includes a binary variable indicating whether the covert shopper perceived the 
pharmacy as “good” or “poor.” This measure is imperfect, as different shoppers may have 
different definitions of “good” looking pharmacies. Nevertheless, it is the closest measure to 29 
 
consumer perception. Table 7 shows the piece-wise correlations between shopper assessment of 
pharmacy and the results of our quality tests. While shopper assessment is significantly and 
positively correlated with each of the three test outcomes, the correlations are quite low: 0.14 
with visual test, 0.27 with minilab test, and 0.24 with spectrometry test. In contrast, the 
correlations within the three test results are much higher (0.44 to 0.82).  
Table 8  reruns the above two specifications with shopper assessment of  good looking 
pharmacies either as the dependent variable (Columns 1-2) or as an additional right hand side 
variable in the test result regression (Columns 3-4) and the log price regression (Columns 5-7). 
As before, we add city and pharmacy fixed effects in the price regression but only use city fixed 
effects for the determination of shopper assessment or test results due to few variations within 
pharmacy.
16  
  In comparison with Table 4, Columns (1) to (2) of Table 8 show that shopper assessment 
is more closely related to literacy rate and GDP per capita than our objective measures of drug 
quality. This could reflect consumer trust in legal enforcement or the market in general. In the 
prediction of whether a drug sample passes all three tests (which is equivalent to passing the 
spectrometry test), we find that shopper assessment has a marginally significant positive effect 
with p-value between 0.1 and 0.05. This is consistent with the weak correlations between 
shopper assessment and test results as shown in Table 7. In the log price regressions, we continue 
to find significant price discount for failing drugs (13.8-17.1%), which suggests that the 
signaling effect of price is not confounded by consumer inference from the look of pharmacies. 
Nevertheless, shopper assessment is also positively correlated with drug price (Columns 5-6), 
                                                       
16 Only 9 observations show variations of shopper assessment within a pharmacy. This happens if different covert 
shoppers bought from the same pharmacy or the same shopper had different views about the pharmacy if he/she 
bought drugs at different times. 
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suggesting that shopper assessment contains some useful information. The negative coefficient 
on shopper assessment in Column (7) is driven by the very few observations that show variations 
in shopper assessment within a specific pharmacy.  
Finally, we would like to mention a number of robustness checks we have done but not 
reported in tables. One is measuring drug price and GDP per capita by purchase power parity 
(PPP) instead of exchange rate. The PPP measures are higher in absolute values, but regression 
results  hardly  change  because  coefficients  are  identified  from  relative  comparison  across 
observations. Another concern is about missing values in some control variables (mostly the tax, 
penalty  and  price  regulations).  The  reported  regressions  include  dummy  variables  indicating 
missing values for each independent variable with missing values.  Alternatively, we have rerun 
the price regression (1) using observations with no missing value in any variable (resulting in a 
sample of 463 observations), or (2) excluding the variables with significant numbers of missing 
values and then conditional on no missing values in other variables (resulting in a sample of 821 
observations). In both cases, we find the estimate of price discount for failing drugs (20.64% and 
25.42%) similar to what is reported in Table 5 Column 1 (21.4%).
17 The third concern is whether 
female literacy rate is better than average literacy rate because women may be more likely to 
purchase drugs for their families. To address this concern, we have rerun the price regression 
with female literacy rate, male literacy rate, or both on the right hand side. In all cases, the 
coefficient on whether a drug fails any test is similar to that using average literacy rate (-0.193, -
0.204, -0.225 versus -0.214 in Table 5 Column 1). 
We also split the sample according to whether female literacy rate is above or below 
sample median. Similar to the results of Table 6, we find the price discount for failing drugs is 
much higher in low-literacy cities (20.31%) than in high-literacy cities (16.7%).  
                                                       
17 Note that regressions with city or pharmacy fixed effects are not sensitive to missing values because most 




Overall, this paper uses a hand-collected data set to examine the problem of poor-quality 
drugs. We have five main findings: first, 15% of the collected drug samples fail at least one 
quality test and the failure is most significantly correlated with whether the drug tends to be an 
innovator brand and whether it is registered with local authority. Second, drugs that fail at least 
one quality test are priced on average 13.6-18.7% lower. Though statistically significant, this 
price  difference  is  small  relative  to  the  unexplained  variations  in  price,  suggesting  that  the 
signaling effect of price is likely incomplete. Third, the price signaling effect is especially noisy 
for generics. Innovator brand is a good signal itself, as drugs with innovator brands are more 
likely to pass the tests, charge much higher price (30%+), and have a tighter price distribution. 
Fourth, price difference between failing and non-failing drugs is greater and most conspicuous in 
countries with lower-than-median literacy rate. Fifth, our covert shoppers are able to extract 
meaningful information from the look of pharmacies, but their subjective assessment is noisy and 
does not explain the signaling effect of price.  
These findings are largely consistent with the theoretical insights that price could reveal 
quality and in such a revealing equilibrium the mark up on high quality products must be greater 
if  consumers  have  more  difficulty  detecting  quality  problems  from  non-price  information. 
However, the price-quality relationship found in our data is not as clean as the theory predicts, 
especially  for  drugs  with  non-innovator  brands.  While  the  high  price  of  innovator  brands 
motivate innovators to keep the reputation of good quality, this incentive is reduced for more 
affordable generic drugs.  Less profit also implies fewer resources for generic manufacturers to 
engage in self-policing or lobby for government protection.    32 
 
More  generally,  our  work  reveals  a  tension  between  drug  affordability  and  the  fight 
against substandard and counterfeit drugs.  The 13.6-18.7% lower price for failing drugs, as well 
as  the  information  contained  in  innovator  brand  and  pharmacy  appearance,  suggests  that 
consumers are likely to suspect lower quality when they pay less. Why do they choose to buy 
drugs  that  are  likely  to  be  of  lower  quality?  One  reason  is  poverty:  in  our  data,  the  price 
differential between failing and non-failing drugs (controlling for other factors) is about $0.59-
0.80, which could be substantial for a country like India where more than 40 percent of the 
population lives on less than $1 a day. Severe poverty, plus ignorance on the harm of poor-
quality drugs, could foster demand for counterfeit and substandard drugs. 
Unfortunately,  public  policies  that  aim  to  lower  drug  price  may  distort  the  price 
mechanism to sort out high quality drugs. In our data, failing drugs and non-failing generics 
overlap greatly in price, making it difficult to identify failing drugs based on price. Moreover, the 
existence of low-price true generics leads consumers to believe that cheap drugs work often, 
which could invite the entry of counterfeits and encourages legitimate producers to cut corners.  
We argue that a policy in favor of generics (over innovator brands) must be accompanied 
by  better  regulation  or  information  about  product  quality.  This  can  be  achieved  by  tighter 
registration requirement, stricter law enforcement against non-registered drugs, more frequent 
sampling and testing of existing drugs, a more transparent information system to report and track 
substandard manufacturers, and better consumer education on ways to identify poor drug quality.  
While medical researchers and non-profit organizations have tried to fulfill these functions, local 
regulators can have more authority and cost advantage to perform them. For example, local drug 
regulators can periodically test random drug samples and de-register those found to be of poor 
quality. They can also blacklist counterfeit manufacturers and prosecute them for legal penalty.  33 
 
When consumers are equipped with better quality information, price will play a lesser role of 
signaling and quality drugs will become more affordable. 
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Figure 1: Raw distributions of log (drug price) for failing and non-failing drugs 
 
Figure 2: Distributions of log (drug price) for failing and non-failing drugs, after controlling for 
local regulations, income and literacy rate (without city fixed effects) 
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Figure 3: Distributions of log (drug price) for failing and non-failing drugs, after controlling for 
local regulations, income and literacy rate (with city fixed effects) 
 
Figure 4: Distributions of log (drug price) for failing and non-failing drugs, after controlling for 




Figure 5: Distributions of log (drug price) for failing drugs, non-failing innovator brands, and 




Figure 6: Distributions of log (drug price) for failing drugs, non-failing innovator brands, and 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 






5.200  0.070  48.900 
ACTs  79  5.591  1.997  2.100  9.000 
Artmono  55  5.912  1.566  2.900  9.200 
CQ  69  0.368  0.514  0.070  2.400 
Cipro  185  8.171  8.516  0.880  48.900 
Isoniazid  146  2.367  2.206  0.280  8.300 
Rifampicin  168  4.056  3.838  0.380  16.200 
SP  78  1.110  0.493  0.400  2.400 
Erythromycin  119  3.456  3.840  0.460  15.200 
=1 if Pass Visual Appearance Test  899  0.966  0.183  0  1 
=1 if Pass Minilab Test  899  0.890  0.313  0  1 
=1 if Pass Spectrometry Test  899  0.845  0.362  0  1 
=1 if fail any test  899  0.155  0.362  0  1 
=1 if the pharmacy looks “good”  899  0.249  0.433  0  1 
=1 if innovator brand  899  0.080  0.272  0  1 
=1 if fail any test | innovator brands  72  0.056  0.229  0  1 
=1 if fail any test | non-innovator 
brands 
827  0.163  0.370  0  1 
=1 if Product Registered  892  0.896  0.306  0  1 
Adult Literacy Rate (%)   828  73.097  10.547  65  99.55 
GDP Per Capita (US$)  899  4839.51  5007.20  193.79  19759.09 
Maximum Penalty (months)  691  233.52  135.80  0  360 
Total Tax  623  11.705  9.447  0  31.4 
=1 if price regulations exist  646  0.786  0.410  0  1 
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Table 2: Test-passing Rates by Country, City and Year 
 
Country  city  year  N  % of passing all 
three tests 
Angola  Luanda  2010  53  75.47 
Brazil  San Paolo  2010  32  96.88 
China  Beijing  2010  40  92.50 
Congo  Lubumbashi  2010  10  60.00 
Egypt  Cairo  2010  58  87.93 
Ethiopia  Addis  2010  36  80.56 
Ghana  Accra  2009  49  83.67 
India  Chennai  2009  100  89.00 
India  Delhi  2008  74  81.08 
India  Delhi  2010  40  82.50 
India  Kolkata  2010  39  84.62 
Kenya  Nairobi  2009  8  75.00 
Kenya  Nairobi  2010  40  70.00 
Nigeria  Lagos  2009  53  79.25 
Russia  Moscow  2010  37  94.59 
Rwanda  Kigali  2010  14  92.86 
Tanzania  Dar  2010  53  83.02 
Thailand  Bangkok  2009  41  82.93 
Turkey  Istanbul  2010  35  100.00 
Uganda  Kampala  2010  44  81.82 
Zambia  Lusaka  2010  43  86.05 














Table 3: Summary Statistics, by Whether the Drug Passed or Failed All the Tests 
  Passing all tests  Fail at least one test 
  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  N  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Drug Price (US$) 
 
760  4.570  5.473  139  2.560  2.772 
ACTs  68  5.679  2.039  11  5.049  1.698 
Artmono  41  5.949  1.543  14  5.807  1.687 
CQ  54  0.398  0.553  15  0.263  0.337 
Cipro  167  8.596  8.728  18  4.236  4.782 
Isoniazid  122  2.506  2.333  24  1.665  1.199 
Rifampicin  147  4.244  3.972  21  2.741  2.409 
SP  58  1.187  0.482  20  0.890  0.467 
Erythromycin  103  3.766  4.031  16  1.469  0.832 
=1 if Product Registered  755  0.951  0.216  137  0.591  0.473 
Adult Literacy Rate (%)   696  73.41  10.89  132  71.44  8.34 
GDP Per Capita (US$)  760  5100.73  5220.40  139  3411.08  3290.96 
Maximum Penalty (months)  585  233.03  137.52  106  236.26  126.43 
Total Tax  520  11.47  9.23  103  12.89  10.45 
=1 if price regulations exist  577  0.804  0.397  89  0.674  0.471 
=1 if pharmacy looks “good”  760  0.795  0.404  139  0.511  0.502 
=1 if innovator brand  760  0.089  0.286  139  0.029  0.168 43 
 
Table 4: Test results in correlation with local factors, Probit 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  

















Adult Literacy Rate (%)  0.001  0.000  0.004***    
   (1.578)  (0.075)  (2.836)    
Log GDP per capita (US$)  0.003  0.032  -0.018  0.098*** 
   (0.563)  (1.623)  (-1.053)  (11.903) 
Maximum Legal Penalty for Drug 
Counterfeiting (in months)  4.07E-06  -0.0002**  -0.0003***    
   (0.124)  (-1.992)  (-3.053)    
 =1 if registered with local drug authority  0.124***  0.384***  0.474***  0.489*** 
   (2.600)  (7.204)  (7.993)  (7.844) 
Total tariffs, taxes and duties (%)  -0.001*  -0.003**  -0.003**    
   (-1.716)  (-2.262)  (-2.022)    
 =1 if intends to be an innovator brand  0.002  0.063***  0.108***  0.122*** 
   (0.232)  (4.145)  (6.794)  (8.659) 
 =1 if price regulations exist  -0.018***  0.069***  0.103***    
   (-3.601)  (3.610)  (5.431)    
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Drug Type FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City FE  No  No  No  Yes 
N  828  899  899  864 
Adjusted R2  0.319  0.225  0.213  0.217 
Note:  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05 ; * p<0.1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All regressions contain missing dummies indicating 
missing values in included variables. Columns (1) and (4) have fewer than 899 observations because some variables included in the 
regressions perfectly predict the dependent variable. Literacy rate, maximum penalty, taxes and price regulations drop out of Column 
(4) because they are absorbed in city fixed effects. 
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Table 5: Price-Quality relationship 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable = log (drug price)   coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
 =1 if fails any of the quality tests  -0.214***  -0.187***  -0.136*** 
   (-6.119)  (-5.282)  (-2.858) 
Adult Literacy Rate (%)  0.028***      
   (3.231)      
Log GDP per capita (US$)  0.452***  0.379***  0.354*** 
   (5.223)  (10.436)  (9.593) 
Maximum Legal Penalty for Drug Counterfeiting (in months)  -0.004***      
   (-6.568)      
 =1 if registered with local drug authority  0.142***  0.166***  0.088** 
   (3.436)  (5.049)  (2.017) 
Total tariffs, taxes and duties (%)  0.021**      
   (2.504)      
 =1 if intends to be an innovator brand  0.355***  0.336***  0.371*** 
   (5.477)  (6.417)  (6.020) 
 =1 if price regulations exist  -0.511***      
   (-3.439)      
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Drug Type FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City FE  No  Yes  No 
Pharmacy FE  No  No  Yes 
N / Adjusted R2  899/0.892  899/0.911  899/0.910 
σ of unexplained log(drug price) for drugs passing all tests  0.426  0.385  0.347 
σ of unexplained log(drug price) for drugs failing at least one test  0.372  0.326  0.311 
Note:  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05 ; * p<0.1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All regressions contain missing dummies indicating 
missing values in included variables. All columns allow robust standard errors with the error term clustered by city. Column (3) does 
not include city fixed effects because they will be absorbed by pharmacy fixed effects. Standard deviations (σ) of unexplained 
log(drug price) are estimated using iterated general least squares assuming heteroscadasticity between failing and non-failing drugs. 
Literacy rate, maximum penalty, taxes and price regulations drop out of Columns (2) and (3) because they are absorbed in city or 





Table 6: Price-quality relationship by above- or below-median literacy rate 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   log(drugprice)  log(drugprice)  log(drugprice) 
   (full sample)  (if literacy >=sample 
median) 
(if literacy <sample 
median) 
   coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
 =1 if fails any of the quality tests       -0.143***  -0.123***  -0.258***  -0.258*** 
        (-3.135)  (-2.640)  (-9.556)  (-9.556) 
 =1 if fails any of the quality tests * if 
literacy > sample median  -0.160***  -0.129***          
   (-3.201)  (-2.976)          
 =1 if fails any of the quality tests * if 
literacy < sample median  -0.278***  -0.253***          
   (-6.699)  (-6.577)          
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Drug Type FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  828  828  444  444  384  384 
Adjusted R2  0.901  0.919  0.801  0.807  0.942  0.942 
Note:  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05 ; * p<0.1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All regressions contain adult literacy rate, 
GDP per capita, product registration, maximum penalty, taxes, price regulations, innovator brands, and missing dummies 
indicating missing values in included variables. All columns allow robust standard errors with the error term clustered by 
city. Samples conditional on countries with valid literacy rate.  
 
 


















Pass visual test  1 
        Pass minilab test  0.4983  1 
      Pass spectrometry test  0.4419  0.8226  1 
    Fail any test  -0.4419  -0.8226  -1  1 
  Pharmacy Assessed Good  0.1448  0.2738  0.2373  -0.2373  1 
Note: all correlations are statistically significant with p-value less than 0.0001. 
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Table 8: Covert shoppers’ pharmacy assessment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 









effects/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
 =1 if fails any of the quality tests              -0.171***  -0.165***  -0.138*** 
            (-5.109)  (-5.133)  (-2.901) 
 =1 if pharmacy looks "good"       0.131*  0.141  0.252***  0.139***  -0.073* 
        (1.740)  (1.612)  (4.151)  (4.132)  (-1.754) 
Adult Literacy Rate (%)  0.011**    0.003**    0.027***      
   (1.970)    (2.379)    (3.518)      
Log GDP per capita (US$)  0.020  0.151***  -0.031*  0.068***  0.413***  0.351***  0.370*** 
   (0.886)  (69.895)  (-1.688)  (4.396)  (5.403)  (9.577)  (9.768) 
Maximum Legal Penalty  -0.000    -0.000***    -0.004***      
   (-1.469)    (-2.801)    (-8.043)      
 =1 if registered   0.159  0.479***  0.406***  0.418***  0.076*  0.129***  0.087** 
   (1.607)  (7.796)  (6.712)  (6.578)  (1.811)  (3.740)  (1.981) 
Total tariffs, taxes and duties (%)  -0.003**    -0.004**    0.021***      
   (-2.001)    (-2.254)    (2.846)      
 =1 if  innovator brand  0.009  0.008  0.102***  0.117***  0.355***  0.337***  0.370*** 
   (0.780)  (0.112)  (6.754)  (9.296)  (5.990)  (6.588)  (6.012) 
 =1 if price regulations exist  0.023    0.108***    -0.475***      
   (0.878)    (4.647)    (-3.561)      
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Drug Type FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Pharmacy FE  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
N  899  632  899  864  899  899  899 
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2  0.305  0.167  0.236  0.239  0.897  0.913  0.910 
Note:  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05 ; * p<0.1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Columns (1)- (4) use probit; Columns (5) -(7) use OLS. All regressions 
contain missing dummies indicating missing values in included variables. All columns allow robust standard errors with the error term clustered by city. 
Literacy rate, maximum penalty, taxes and price regulations drop out of Columns (2), (4), (6) and (7) because they are absorbed in city or pharmacy 
fixed effects. 48 
 
Appendix 
A.1. Description of Drugs Sampled 
Drug Name  Dosage  For Treatment Of 
Ciprofloxacin  250mg, 500mg  Bacterial infections 
Erythromycin  250mg , 500mg  Bacterial infections 
Isoniazid   100mg  Tuberculosis 
Rifampicin  300mg  Tuberculosis 
Chloroquine (CQ)  250mg  Malaria 
Sulphadoxine/Pyrimethamine 
(SP) 













20mg/120mg  Malaria 
 
A.2. Description of Tests Used 
Test  How it is Performed  What a Pass or Fail Implies 
Visual Inspection  By comparison with a real 
version, or by simply noting 
spelling errors, or other 
errors 





Minilab (Thin Layer 
Chromatography) 
Does the drug dissolve in 
body temperature water 
within 30 minutes 
Assessing the active 
ingredient of the drug using 
TLC 
Failure implies drug solubility 
poor 
 
Failure implies insufficient 
active ingredient 
 Raman Spectrometry   Assessing the Rama Spectra 
of the product 
 Failure implies incorrect drug 
formulation 
 
 
 